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De Peyster, John Watts

# PRACTICAL STRATEGY,

AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE

## LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

OF A

MASTER OF THE ART,

THE

# Austrian Field Marshal

# TRAUN.

FREDERIC THE GREAT'S PRECEPTOR

IN THE

ART OF WAR.

"MARSHAL TRAUN, that was a Man indeed!"

"I went to school to TRAUN."

FREDERIC THE GREAT.

CATSKILL

JOSEPH JOESBURY, BOOK AND JOB PRINTER, "JOURNAL OFFICE"

1863.

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## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

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"Je n' ai rien fait pour la posterite, pourtant"—ajouta-t-il, en designant son front  
—"j' avais la quelque chose."

ANDRE-MARIE CHENIER,

About to die by the Guillotine, 25th July, 1794.

### WASTE OF LIFE DURING THE PRESENT WAR.

*(Could it not have been obviated by the comprehension of  
Practical Strategy?)*

"The natural principle of war is to do the most harm to our enemy with the least harm to ourselves, and this, of course, is to be effected by stratagem," (i. e., practical strategy.)

WASHINGTON IRVING.

"A victory is twice itself, when the achiever brings home full numbers."

SHAKESPEARE, *Much Ado*. I, 1.

This pamphlet was prepared in a great measure about a year since, and finished within the month. It is called forth by the contemplation of resultless, or comparatively resultless combats, and a prodigal waste of such a PERSONAL as has never before constituted the bulk of armies. The Loyal North has suffered such repeated sacrifices of superior men, that the question forces itself upon the mind, whether such expenditure of life was absolutely necessary, and whether or not it was not chargeable to ignorance or incomprehension of the plainest rules of true generalship, Practical Strategy.

The most thoughtless and unfeeling man could scarcely repress a shudder, if he would only pause to reflect upon instances of the fearful waste of our best, bravest and most experienced officers and privates, staked with a desperation, unworthy the military art, upon almost im-

possible results; regular Balaclava charges, presenting equal chances of destruction with far inferior chances of success and glory. These sacrifices are not necessarily attributable to leaders in the field. Like the Balaclava charge, they may have originated in orders sent from superiors at a distance, and given in ignorance of the actual condition of affairs upon the spot. It is the function of the future to place the guilt where it belongs.— Unfortunately public men are put on trial too late to expiate their sins in person, they only suffer in reputation, and very few men, especially political men, in this country, care for posthumous reputation. The only rewards they seek are tangible ones.

Before entering upon the career of the General selected as an example of what can be accomplished by scientific practical strategy, it would be well to consider what the greatest military authorities have remarked about fighting battles, and that although men may not have any value in the eyes of *extemporized* leaders, they were nevertheless rated at their true value by the most scientific and successful generals who have lived. And it would be well to remember that even the victorious and magnificent Marlborough owed his disgrace and supersedure in a great measure to the obloquy which fell upon him, in consequence of what was considered his “wanton sacrifice of so many gallant men to his personal ambition, without any solid benefit to the allies,” his reckless waste of his best troops upon the “triple lines” of Malplaquet.

“Every war,” remarked Napoleon, “should be systematical, because every war should have an object, and should be carried on according to the principles and rules of the art (of war). A war should be prosecuted with forces (material as well as personal) proportionate to the obstacles which have to be overcome.”

Have our Generals, with the exception perhaps of Rosecrans and Gilmore, paid due attention to this maxim? Have they ever apparently weighed means and obstacles; materials in hand with materials indispensable to the object? In fact, how many military maxims of acknowledged authority have our generals ignored? And if every hour conceded to the enemy for fortification be equal to the reinforcement of a battalion to that enemy, against what odds have our soldiers been called upon to combat? with what disproportionate means have our leaders undertaken to compel victory? How many of our Generals have ever been influenced in their action by the maxim:

“If your enemy is entrenching, and it is your intention to attack his position, do not delay a moment. Every hour’s delay may cost the loss of a thousand men in an assault.” This was Marlborough’s opinion.

The greatest test, as well as the duty of a General, is to avoid an unnecessary battle. The grandest generalship is to conquer without fighting. To fight requires mere courage; to coerce without fighting, science.

The campaign of the Allied Spanish-French army under the orders of the Duke of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in 1706, serves as a useful study in regard to offensive defensive operations, or practical strategy, carried out in actuality. The two armies, thrusting and parrying, made almost a circuit of Spain. They opened the campaign near Bajados, (extreme West,) manœuvred across Old (West-North and Centre) and New (East-centre) Castile, and finished the fencing bout in Valentia (East) and Murcia (South-East). The army of the Duke of Berwick occupied not less than 85 different camps, and, although the campaign presents no pitched battle,

the Portuguese army, opposed to the Anglo-French leader, lost in prisoners alone, about 10,000 men.

When the Duke of Alva, one of the great captains of modern times, was reproached with manœuvring too much, and too often avoiding an engagement in which the chances appeared to be in his favor, the astute Spaniard replied, the object, invariably, of every General is to get the better of, or conquer, his opponent or the enemy, and not always to fight, for, when a campaign has been carried on successfully, a General has triumphed, whether he has fought a battle or not.

Macchiavelli, who lived and wrote two centuries previous, expressed this idea much more neatly. "Good Generals," he remarked, "only fight battles when necessity compels them to, or the opportunity is eminently propitious."

This idea, however, does not originate with either of the above, for Pericles, the Athenian, that spoiled child of fortune, who flourished in the beginning of the Vth Century B. C., asserted that "it was often the last resource and the proof of a poor general to fight a battle, and, on the other hand, the evidence of superlative generalship to triumph without fighting."

Napoleon Bonaparte enunciated the same great truth rather by his action than by his teaching, although he often expressed the same advice more at length.

And Frederic the Great, far superior to either of the preceding, put more faith in Practical Strategy than in downright fighting, and like Hannibal, his prototype in antiquity, preferred successes achieved by manœuvring to those won by hammer and tongs work, although he did enough of both. He left behind him many wise counsels, not the least of which "Always be beforehand with, or

trip up, the enemy," and the strenuous advice to spare no pains to preserve an army acclimated to war.

Finally, in regard to the comparative value of Veterans and Recruits, listen to the experience of the astute Duke of Alva, and the great (great in every sense) Gustavus Adolphus, and the sagacious Frederic of Prussia, and the interestedly wise and superlatively cunning Napoleon, and, then, when their testimony has been duly weighed, there are few but will decide with Augustus Cæsar :

"*FESTINA lente*," l. c., "Hasten slowly."  
 "Do not let impetuosity betray into imprudence."

with Vauban, and with Traun, that it is better to wait a little and let science compensate for valor and blood, and that the greatest generalship is to preserve valuable lives by vigilance and address :

"*Festinare nocet, nocet et cunctatio sæpe :*  
*Tempore quæque suo qui facit, ille sapit.*"—[OVID.]

"It is injurious to be precipitate, and delay is also frequently injurious. That man is wise, who does every thing in its proper time"—and thus reserves his good troops for the hour when a decisive blow can be struck.

"It was a saying of GUSTAVUS, that he never desired to place himself at the head of more than 40,000 men; paying no regard to a military maxim equally profane and foolish, namely, that the Supreme Being always favors the greater squadrons; (a constant saying of Walstein, attributed in error to Frederic the Great and others,) that *a larger number of troops was only matter of parade and incumbrance, inasmuch as no general could compel him in the aforementioned circumstances, to accept a battle except he chose it*, whilst in the interim he could dispose of superfluous forces to better advantage elsewhere. Concurrently with what is here asserted, it was the opinion



both of DUKE D' ALVA and TURENNE, that no army ought to consist of more than 50,000 men; and the former used always to say, that VETERAN troops were the bones and muscles of the military body, and that new raised recruits only filled up the interstices with shape and plumpness."

"Great commanders are tied up to *no such rules*, (i. e., collecting huge armies to watch *reported* huge armies,) and his Prussian Majesty, (FREDERIC THE GREAT,) not dissatisfied to immitate GUSTAVUS in most things, has subdivided his armies in the same manner as that Prince would do were he now living. If one general portions out his troops with proper precaution, the other will be compelled to follow the example. WALSTEIN, who first invented this method of waging war, played the artifice upon GUSTAVUS; for he wanted, like our dextrous neighbors, to protract the time, and plunge his enemies into enormous expenses, which is true policy with respect to opposing any army that carries on a war out of its own country; but GUSTAVUS despised the futility of this stratagem, and though he had only 18,000 men wherewith to confront above 50,000, he allowed three separate bodies of his own troops to range freely throughout the empire, and entrenched himself under the beard of the Imperial General, who in the event was obliged to decamp, and take such cards as the Swedish monarch was pleased to deal him."

Neither should the lessons ever be forgotten, nor the consideration be neglected, of "*the extraordinary advantages* he (Gustavus) extracted from WINTER CAMPAIGNS; which may be considered, partly, as a new military practice (at his era); and it was from the same principle, that he gave little or no countenance to councils of war." Since the essence of true practical strategy is secrecy, in that the plan of operations which succeeds best is ever

that one of which the enemy is kept in total ignorance, the blow following the order as the hand obeys the brain.

“This obliges me (FREDERIC the Great,) to observe that, a General would be wrong should he be in haste to attack the enemy in hilly posts, or on broken ground. I have sometimes, by *necessity*, been forced to this extremity; but, *when war is made with equal powers, advantages more certain may be procured by stratagem and address, and without exposing an army to equal danger.* The sum of many small advantages will be great. The attack of a well defended post is beside a bone of hard digestion, and the assailant is liable to be repulsed and beaten, (witness Fredericksburg 1st and 2d.) It is only to be carried by the sacrifice of from 15 to 20,000 men, which makes a wide breach in an army. Recruits, supposing they are to be plentifully obtained, will fill up numbers, but will not supply the qualities of the soldiers that have been lost.—The kingdom becomes depopulated by renewing the army; the troops degenerate; and, if the war is long, the General will find himself at the head of ill disciplined peasants, with whom he scarcely dares appear in face of the enemy. In any violent conjuncture, I grant, it is necessary to depart from rules, and to have recourse to desperate remedies; as poison is given to the sick, when there are no other means of cure. But, such cases excepted, it is requisite, in my opinion, to proceed with more caution; to weigh and to measure; because that *the General who allows the least to chance is the most able.*”

“When a nation has neither CADRES,” (which after all is but another word for VETERANS, or experienced troops and officers, or synonymous in a great measure,) says Napoleon, “and the Elements of Military Organization, it is very difficult for that country to organize an army.” Now who else but men who have learned their business

in actual war, and by the observation of military crises, can provide such Elements. If Generals waste their best men and officers, particularly against works and cannon, for the best men always suffer where courage and ability is required, a country must eventually depend upon the refuse which remains behind, inferior indeed in head work, hand work, and heart work. "The *first* quality of a soldier is *fortitude* in supporting fatigues and privation, VALOR is but SECONDARY." "To a soldier two qualities are indispensable, *Fortitude* and *Discipline*; Courage itself is but secondary." Fortitude and Discipline are the attributes of old troops. Young troops are often as brave or reckless as veterans as far as regards throwing life away. Want, privations and suffering, are the best school of a soldier. Young troops cannot possess those qualities because to acquire such properties requires a long course of education or training. To sacrifice good old regiments is like turning the intelligent and industrious out of school and keeping on only with the dunces and slothful. "To fight and to suffer" is the soldiers motto. Many great Generals have testified that young troops have fought desperately, but they have also added that sufferings they could not encounter or support.

Consequently PRACTICAL STRATEGY, which preserves life, is as much an obligation upon a General as it is the duty of a surgeon to preserve a limb by treatment. The poorest surgeon can *barber* off a member, but it is often the highest glory of the best surgeon to save one. To what then are we to attribute the prodigal waste of life which has characterized this war. To all those appointers and appointees who have underestimated and miscomprehended Practical Strategy. To prove what a Master of the Art did accomplish through the observance and application of its Rules, and to show what can be effected

by a General, hailed by his soldiers on a bloody field as  
 "Our Father!" who valued the lives of his troops, under-  
 stood his business, and knew how to economize them, this  
 little work has been written. ANCHOR.

*Tivoli, 1st August, 1863.*

FREDERIC THE GREAT'S PRECEPTOR  
IN THE  
ART OF WAR,  
FIELD MARSHAL TRAUN,  
A MASTER OF PRACTICAL STRATEGY.

"I went to school to Traun."—FREDERIC THE GREAT.

—:O:—

All men do not believe with Dryden that—

"Time, place, and action, may with pains be wrought,  
But genius must be born, and never can be taught."

but rather with Wilcox, that—

"The lamp of genius, tho' by nature lit,  
If not protected, prun'd and fed with care,  
Soon dies, or runs to waste with fitful glare."

Consequently, whenever nations acknowledge the pre-eminence of a leader, they naturally inquire "Where did this man or hero learn to be so great?" "Who was his instructor and exemplar?" "Who and what kindled his latent talent into efficient brilliancy?" It is not always easy to answer, "Few minds are sunlike, sources of light in themselves and to others," particularly among Generals. Sometimes pre-eminence has been due in a great measure, nay almost entirely, to inborn properties, as in the cases of Cæsar, Conde, the great Gustavus, Torstenson, Cromwell, but more particularly Clive. In the last instance it may justly be credited to the individual himself. At other times, as in the case of Washington, to a good; and of Napoleon, in fact both the successful

Napoleons, to a sagacious mother. Hannibal owed his greatness to his great father and race, his surroundings and circumstances; Charles X, Gustavus, of Sweden, and Wrangel to Torstenson; Torstenson, as far as example and opportunity, Baner and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to Gustavus Adolphus. Turenne and Montecuculi grew into eminent commanders. In both, their great and peculiar talents were the result of profound study. As Napoleon remarked, the former was the only General who constantly gained by experience.

Frederic the Great was in some respects a born, in many others a made General. His innate properties were due to position, his acquired to opportunities digested by capacity and applied with intelligence. Macauley demonstrates this with his peculiar clearness, and every history testifies, that *Frederic had a Master* in the Art of War. To whom, then, did the great Prussian attribute his final practically strategic superiority? The King himself has told us, and cotemporaries have corroborated the fact. To Marshal TRAUN, who manœuvred him out of Bohemia in 1744.

“It was in the midst of difficulty and disgrace (wrote Macauley) that he caught the first clear glimpse of the principles of the military art. \* \* \* This year (1745) is memorable in the life of Frederic, as the date at which his noviciate in the art of war may be said to have terminated. There have been great captains whose precocious and self taught military skill resembled intuition, Conde, Clive, and Napoleon are examples. But Frederic was not one of these brilliant portents. His proficiency in military science was simply the proficiency which a man of vigorous faculties makes in any science to which he applies his mind with earnestness and industry.”

“Do you know who taught me the little I know in

*military matters?"* said Frederic to the Prince de Ligne in 1770. "*Your old (the Austrian) Marshal TRAUN, THAT WAS A MAN INDEED!*" At another time he confessed he "*went to school to Traun.*"

Who was this TRAUN, this touch-stone to reveal the true metal which lay hid in the great Frederic? Let us see. His biography is worth reading, and new to the American public, and not so well known as it should be in Europe. The foil and competitor of so great a monarch-general must have been a man indeed to receive such an eulogy from his lips.

Otto Ferdinand, Count of Abensburg and TRAUN, Royal-Imperial (Austrian) Field Marshal, Privy Councilor, Commander in Chief in Transylvania, Knight of the Golden Fleece, &c., was born 27th August 1677, and died at Herman-Stadt, capital of his Province, 10th February 1748. He sprang from one of the ancient and one of the most noble families of Bavaria, and was at first destined for a civil or administrative career. But no man thoroughly imbued with a conviction of his true destination can, in the end, mislead his instinctive inclinations for the profession, nature herself has prepared him to shine in. Circumstances may delay or suppress the operation of these instincts, but, earlier or later, they will exert a controlling influence. So it was with the young Traun. No sooner had he learned the death of his father and thereby become master of his own movements, than he left the High School at Halle and, entered the Brandenburg contingent to the Imperial army. He was present at the famous siege of Namur in 1695, which, Louis XIV, by Vauban, after its capture in 1692, had made the strongest fortress in the Netherlands. So strong was it considered that it displayed over its gate the inscription "Restored it may be, captured it can never

be." In furious assaults and sallies, the besiegers and the besieged lost, within 67 days, not less than 40,000 men.— At last the persevering courage and efforts of the great William (III) of Orange, directed by the genius of Cohorn, as great and famous although not as well known as his cotemporary rival and antagonist, Vauban, proved successful and, in sight of a French army, over 100,000 in number, under the Marshal Villeroi, sent to relieve them, the garrison capitulated notwithstanding the boasting motto over the gates.

Soon after Count Traun entered the Imperial service, made, 1702 to 1708, the campaigns, on the Rhine and in Italy, during the war of the Spanish Succession, but only rose step by step, because he neither accepted promotion at the expense of his seniors nor would owe his advancement to the advantages of his birth and its influences.

Nevertheless, in 1704, at the age of 27, his merits had already made him Colonel and Adjutant-General.

The best witness of TRAUNS' ability was his selection by the wise, brave and distinguished Guido, of Starhemberg, to accompany him as adjutant-general, to Spain, where he co-operated notably in the preparation and execution of the many glorious undertakings of this justly styled "great Captain." To reward his services, he received, in 1712, the command of the so styled Eckish (Austrian) Infantry regiment, coupled with the truly honorable request to continue with the army in Spain. "This young man will command armies," answered the cold, astute Starhemberg to the British commander, Stanhope, when the latter saw Traun, aged 35, for the first time at the former's headquarters, and, misled by his frank boyish expression, asked in a somewhat scornful tone "Who then is this young man?"

But neither time nor space permit us to follow step by



step TRAUN'S progress in the military career. Sufficeth, he was always at the post of duty and danger and in the battle of Franca Villa, 17th (20th ?) June 1719, which lost the Spaniards, Sicily, received a dangerous wound.

In 1723, Traun became Major-General; in 1727 Governor of Messina, and subsequently Governor-General of Sicily, whence he was re-called for the defence of Naples in the impending general conflict.

When the War of the Polish Succession, 1733, caused by the double election, by contending parties, of two rival kings at Warsaw and Cracow, kindled a general war in Europe, Austria, opposed again to Spain, made Italy, (always the principal battle field between Germany and the Western powers) the especial theatre of the contest.— With prescience and emphasis, Count TRAUN had urged upon his (the Austrian) government (even as fruitlessly however as MOREAU counselled Macdonald, to the same effect, in 1799) to concentrate their scanty forces into a single army in Lower Italy and march at once, boldly, to meet the Spanish army advancing from Tuscany under the Infant, DON CARLOS, a young leader, active, ambitious and not without personal ability. He had 16,000 foot and 6,000 horse, the Austrians not more than 10,000 in the whole peninsula. Naples had been committed to the protection of its militia (vain reliance as it proved) and its immediate garrison. Austria, as usual (as is generally the case under similar circumstances, as has been proved more than once at home during our present war) wished to keep all, occupied each castle and every fort, and *scattered her forces, while the enemy concentrated theirs, and thus lost everything.* With not more than 3,000 men TRAUN threw himself into the boundary pass of St. Germano, at the foot of Monte Cassino; through the mountain

line stretching across Italy from Gaeta to Termoli;— showed face to the enemy, maintained his post 23 days, prayed earnestly for reinforcements and—found no hearing for his desperate appeals. Then, he resolved by a bold, well-combined march to get the start of the enemy and unite himself with another Austrian corps at Capua and there, under the protection of this fortress, again make bold front to the enemy. But, how great was his astonishment, when he arrived at *Capua* to find it by no means in the condition nor as susceptible of defence as he had hoped. A less able and energetic commander, misled by the desperate condition of affairs and when he found the defences dismantled, would have considered his duty fulfilled, if he had quietly waited for the enemy to present themselves in outnumbering forces, and then have yielded gracefully, feeling he had done all could have been expected of him, according to old, but bad old custom.— This is the way, the bad old custom, our generals, ordinarily, seem justified in following.

But Traun was of another mould. He thought nothing was done so long as anything remained to be done, and a determined spirit is an inexhaustible mine of resources. He threw himself in the fortress of Capua, repaired the walls as quickly as possible, cast up new outworks, and made every imaginable preparation for the most persevering and courageous resistance. Two glorious enterprises particularly distinguished this defence. The first, in which he captured from the enemy, in a hardy sally, 40 provision and ammunition wagons, together with 70,000 ducats [say \$225,000 in hard cash]; the second, in which he enticed the Spaniards under a masked battery, and caused a horrible slaughter. Reference to the famous Zedler Lexicon, Vol. 45, published in 1745, furnishes the details of the latter success which are worthy of consider-

ation. Among the outworks Traun constructed were three small forts, skillfully disposed to facilitate and cover his intended sallies. When these were finished, Traun traced out a fourth, working with great diligence, but left a gap in the connecting lines, where he felt assured that the Spaniards would attack him, to prevent the completion of the work. During the night of the 21st-22d September, he moved out of Capua with five to six hundred men and several cannon, and posted them about the locality he had planned as a trap, using every precaution to prevent the Spaniards from discovering that he had artillery with him. The Austrians then sent forward working parties, and began to dig as if they intended to perfect their earthwork during the darkness. The bait took, and they were at once attacked by 1500 Spaniards. A brisk skirmish ensued, the Austrian outposts, after a little, falling back steadily, so as to entice the enemy on. When the assailants had reached the spot where Traun desired to have them, whose bearings and ranges had been properly taken the preceding day, Traun's artillery opened upon them instantly with cannister shot, and kept up such a quick and steady cross-fire, that a perfect massacre ensued. The Spaniards were too bewildered and shattered to make good their escape, until 500 had been killed who were counted upon the ground next morning; their wounded were estimated at an equal number. This stratagem won great credit for Traun.

But truly after Visconti's disgraceful abandonment of Naples; after the bloody defeat of the Imperialists at Bitonto, by Montemar [25th May, 1734],—[where the Austro-Neapolitan army was composed principally of Lower-Italian Militia, who [*as usual with militia when opposed to old troops in the field*] ran away and left their Austrian officers to fight like common soldiers gloriously

but in vain];—after the fall of Gaeta, in August, and all the remaining strong places, affairs in Lower Italy could not be restored or longer maintained by any genius or exertion. So *Capua* had at last—it had the honor to be the last—to capitulate, 24th November, but not before **TRAUN'S** heroic declaration, “That the besiegers could only wrest his weapons out of his hands when dead,” had won from the besiegers, so overpowering in numbers, the most honorable terms, and permission for him to retire not only with his garrison but with his whole war material, and with all the honors of war. The Neapolitan historian, General Colletta, after eulogising the defence, and stating that when *Capua* surrendered *the magazines were empty and the hospitals full*, adds, “Traun’s military glory was increased by his ill-fortune.”

In 1733, Traun had attained the rank of Field Marshal. Lieutenant, in 1735 that of *Feld-zeug-meister*, [sometimes, in error, translated General of Artillery or Master General of the Ordnance, in reality equivalent to Senior-General of Infantry,] inferior only to that of Field Marshal, the highest in the scale of the Austrian military hierarchy. In this capacity he was employed to put down an outbreak at home.

The dignity of Privy Counselor and the nomination as Commander-in-Chief and Provisional Viceroy in the dukedom of Milan, in 1736, recompensed the sagacity, promptness and determination Traun had displayed in crushing out the insurrection of the *Coruzzin*, or Cross Betheren, inhabitants of Eastern Hungary along the Koros river, bordering on Transylvania, in the previous year, 1735. With noble self-denial he offered to be satisfied with one half the salary which the former Viceroy had enjoyed, when he learned the empty condition of the treasury of

his new jurisdiction. In 1737, Parma, Piacenza and Mantua were added to his government. In this capacity of Imperial representative, after the death of Charles VI, he received the homage of these dukedoms in behalf of that monarch's daughter, Maria Theresa, 21st January, 1741. In the preceding March, 1740, Traun had reached the summit of military dignity by his appointment as General-Field-Marshal.

In 1742 the death of the Emperor Charles VI, once more brought all the nations of Europe into the arena of battle, and, according to invariable rule, Italy was the stage whereon blood flowed in torrents, in a quarrel, in a great measure, foreign to its people. Traun commanded the Austrian forces, in conjunction with the Sardinians, at first under their king, and afterwards under the Count of Aspremonte, and after beating and manœuvring his antagonist, the Spanish General, the Duke de Montemar, victor of Bitonto, out of Northern Italy, with the loss of half his army, he defeated Montemar's successor, the Spanish Marshal Count de Gages, at Campo Santo, 8th February in the succeeding year 1743. Many incidents connected with this conflict resemble those preceding Waterloo. The Spanish officers [like Wellington's] were at a Grand Ball, given by the city of Bologna, [in 1815 at Brussels] when their General's intention to march to attack Traun was quietly communicated to them at the height of the festivity. One by one they slipped out, joined their troops already in order of march and thus, a force variously estimated at from 12,400 to 24,000 Spaniards moved to catch Traun napping, and found him wide awake to greet them with bullets. It is said that the Spaniards had carefully guarded all the gates and modes of egress from Bologna and observed the greatest secrecy, but that a friend of the Austrians found means at

the risk of his life to give warning to Traun. Traun did not spare himself on this occasion, but threw himself without thought of self into the bloodiest mid-melee to enflame his troops by word and deed, since his forces—especially the cavalry—had suffered severely in the beginning of the battle. Two horses, one after the other, were shot under him. With youthful ardor altho' he bore the weight of 66 years, Traun sprang upon the third, and amid the cry of "Our father lives!" broke through the ranks of the Spanish grenadiers. The victory would have been more complete if he had been able to follow up the enemy, which he could have done to their destruction, had the reinforcements, hastening to join him, arrived, as was expected, two days earlier. (How many reverses must be charged to the non-arrival of promised reinforcements, withheld or delayed.) Nevertheless, the Spaniards lost eventually, in consequence of their defeat 12,000 men, half their whole force, upon the immediate theatre of hostilities.

\* \* \* \* \*

The campaign of Traun and Charles Emanuel III, King of Sardinia, in Northern and Central Italy, against Montemar and the Hispano-Neapolitan forces, in July-August, 1742, resembles somewhat that of the Duke of Berwick against the Portuguese, cited by Decker and referred to in the Introduction (Page 4-5) to this Biography. Traun moved from his head-quarters at Coreggio, in the Modenese, and, in July, took Mirandola, a town of note, strongly fortified for the era, in the N. E. angle of the same duchy. Colletta estimates that the coalesced Austro-Sardinian forces equalled those of the Spaniards and Neapolitans combined, but there is nothing elsewhere which corroborates this large estimate. This conquest and subsequent manœuvres compelled Monte-

mar, although at the head of 40,000 men, good troops, for the offensive and protection of the Mondenese, to abandon even the Bolognese. He broke up his camp at Bondeno, on the Panaro, in the N. W. Ferrarese, whence he retreated, in the hastiest manner, through San Giorgio and Argenta, to Ravenna, thence by Cesena, Rimini, Pesaro, and Fano, that is down along the coast of the Adriatic, whence from Fano he moved across the Apennines, whose desolateness in this locality give them an aspect of altitude they do not in reality possess, to Foligno, about midway between the seas which wash the Peninsula. This retreat is the more inexplicable as he ignored the defensibleness of the Passo del Furlo and narrow vallies of the Metauro and Cantiano, through which his route lay. It has been alleged as an excuse for Montemar's hurried retreat, that it was owing to the desertion of the Neapolitans. This could not be so since they did not separate from the Spaniards and march off homewards until Montemar had retreated twice, altogether 250 miles. Abandoned to his own resources, Montemar continued his retrograde into the Stato degli Presidii, on the Tuscan coast and Canal of Elba, a territory held at this time by the Spaniards to facilitate their military communications between the Milanese and Naples.

As far as Foligno, 250 miles, the Austro-Sardinians kept up a hot pursuit of the enemy. Thence, owing to the invasion of Savoy by the French, which called away the King of Sardinia to the defence of this duchy, the germ of his kingdom, the farther retreat of the Spaniards, about 100 miles, was unmolested.

After the departure of Charles Emanuel, whose race, however heroic, have ever proved inconstant and unreliable in their alliances, where interest conflicted with

compacts, Traun fell back and occupied the line of the Panaro, from Buonporto, South, to Solaro, North, to cover the recently conquered Modenese.

Meanwhile, the Spanish forces, recruited in every sense, under a new commander, Marshal, Count of Gages, had retraced their steps, eastwards and northwards, by the very roads upon which they had retreated. In October, Gages was again in the presence of the Austrians, with positive orders to seek out the enemy and to offer them battle. Whether and when it would be accepted, however, depended upon the plans of the Austrian practical strategist, not the will of the Spanish Count Marshal.

Traun had assumed the defensive against his will and conviction. The Austrian army was not strong enough to act independently even of the small subsidiary Sardinian force, which its king had left with Traun, under the Count of Aspremonte. This latter General had received commands to co-operate with the Austrians, if the Spaniards crossed the Panaro to attack them, but in no event to pass that river and act offensively against the enemy, the Spaniards.

Traun was too good a commander to remain on the simple defensive, and his offensive-defensive was dashing for his era. From his camps on the Panaro, his detachments operated as far Imola and Ravenna, 40 to 60 miles to the front, and his hussars, even when compelled to fall back, inflicted severe losses upon the enemy following them up.

Both armies occupied an antagonistic position on the Panaro analagous to that of the Rebel and Federal forces along the Potomac, 1861-'2, with this difference that Traun with inferior numbers held Gages in check just as the Rebels paralyzed the far more numerous Loyal army.—What renders the resemblance more striking is that Traun pushed a column across to Bazzano, 11 miles W. of Bol-



ogna, which would not inaptly represent our operations towards Martinsburg and Winchester. Here the Austrians however strongly entrenched themselves and prevented any forward movement of the enemy. Finally, McDowell and Gages delivered battles in obedience to orders or under the pressure of popular clamor and were defeated.

The Spanish Generals now resolved to make an attempt to quarter themselves upon abundant Tuscan hitherto spared the presence of an enemy. At once Traun despatched a corps of 5 to 6,000 men across the rude mountains of Po(a)retta, (*Alpi Pannie* or *Apuane*;) famous for sulphur baths, about midway an air line between Modena and Prato, to join a corps under General Breitwitz, stationed at Pistoja, and prevent the Spaniards from occupying those rich districts. This was an energetic move at so late a season and in so treacherous a mountain district as the Apennines. It was successful.

Both armies, now, went into winter (1742-'3) quarters. Traun's head-quarters were at Carpi, the apex of the triangle occupied by his forces, whose base was the Panaro. His troops were so posted that while they sufficiently protected the whole Eastern boundary of the Modenese they could be concentrated with the utmost ease and celerity.

Spurred into sudden action by orders from his distant and unmilitary superiors, by news of reverses experienced by the Sardinians on their western frontier at the hands of the French and Spaniards, by his expectations of taking Traun by surprise, and by his calculations of overwhelming the Austrians in detail before they had received the promised reinforcements already on the march from Germany, Marshal Gages plunged forward with violence and was hurled back with destruction. This result proves

the necessity of making such a disposition of troops as to favor their immediate concentration, and the bringing of their forces as a *unit* to bear upon a *fraction* of the enemy, and of the necessity of understanding the simple rules by which it can be done. There is no doubt that any man who possesses the requisite combination of qualities to understand and apply such rules will make a better general than the most scientifically educated officer without the necessary aptitude. Banks is an example. Wellington showed his strong sense by the following remark, here truly apposite, which, put in practice by him, won all his successes. "I know (quoting Cust,) that one man occupies 2 feet of front; therefore, as the soldiers are in 2 ranks, each man may be said to occupy '4 sq. ft.' of ground; therefore, 5,000 men occupy a mile in length; and, consequently, it will require the same time that a man can march a mile to bring up the rear of a column of 5,000 men to the point from which the head has started."

The battle of Campo Santo has been deemed worthy of particular elucidation by VON KAUSLER in his celebrated "Atlas and Text of Memorable Battles," &c. In some respects, throwing out Sedgwick's corps and taking no account of the difference in numbers, but only the manœuvering and dispositions of the troops, it may be considered as bearing some resemblance to the battle of Chancellorsville, particularly as regards the position of the armies as to each other and to the Panaro, the attendant circumstances and the result:—that is as far as little battles can be compared with large ones.

As above mentioned Marshal Count of Gages hurried forwards, 1st February, 1743, from Bologna, crossed the Panaro [navigable at this point,] 4th February, on two bridges of boats, near Campo Santo, and pushed on as far as Solaro, hoping to surprise the Austro-Piedmontese in

their winter quarters in the Modenese. Having learned from spies and scouts that Traun had concentrated his troops at Buonporto, he, Gages, abandoned the offensive and fell back rapidly upon Bologna. On the 6th of February his troops were again at Campo Santo, and, on the 7th, the Spanish train commenced their retreat over the Panaro. This movement continued throughout that day and was not completed on the morning of the 8th, when the troops themselves made ready to follow their equipages.

While the Spaniards were thus losing time in accordance with their usual sluggish mode of procedure, Traun was following them up upon the road from Mirandola to Campo Santo. On the night of the 7th-8th February, he encamped on the little marshy stream of La Reggiana, just across from San Felice, about three miles from the enemy. He halted, because he hoped by the delay to catch the Spaniards, just as Meade ought to have caught the rebels; while actually crossing the river in their rear, with part of their forces on this, and part of their forces on that, side of it.

On the morning of the 8th, Traun sent forward detachments of light infantry and cavalry, under Colonel Hohenau, to reconnoitre the Spanish position. The Spanish artillery was actually in movement to cross the river in their rear, when Traun's advance showed themselves on their extreme left. That Traun sent forward Hohenau at all proved a great mistake on his part, for, as soon as his eclaireurs showed themselves, Marshal Gages saw it was impossible to effectuate his retreat in the presence of the enemy, and rapidly formed his line of battle. His left rested upon the Panaro, and his right upon three large ponds, marshes, country houses and farm buildings, (*casinos*.) presenting an obtuse angle to the

Austro-Piedmontese, whose apex was near the road upon which the Allies were advancing.

Gages had 31 battalions of regular infantry and 2 companies of volunteers, 10,000, and 4 regiments of cavalry, 2,400, total, 12,400 men. The Austro-Piedmontese, 24 battalions of infantry, 8,000, and 4 regiments of cavalry, and 1 of Slavonians serving like voltigeurs proper, both on foot and on horseback, 2,600, total, 10,600 men.

Traun advanced in columns with the majority of the artillery on his right wing, which he appears to have intended to refuse while he occupied therewith the attention of the Spanish left. The majority of his cavalry constituted his right wing which were to make a flank movement and turn the Austrian right over marshy ground, frozen however at this time, which the Austrians had not occupied, between the ponds and river. This neglect, although at one period, apparently retrieved, no doubt lost the battle, since it necessitated the transferral of troops from the left to right and much manœuvring under fire, always unadvisable even with the best of soldiers.

As soon as the Austro-Piedmontese advanced to the attack, the Spanish general sent detachments to occupy the space between their right and the Panaro and charged the Austrian cavalry, in the act of deploying to charge the Spanish infantry. This counter-charge, elegantly executed, like that of Seydlitz at Rossbach, was completely successful, and the Austro-Piedmontese cavalry were so effectually broken that they may be said to have taken no farther part in the battle. They appeared again when it was about over, but even then accomplished little or nothing. The Spanish cavalry, however, were equally culpable, and seemed content with their success. Instead of throwing themselves upon the allies left, entirely denuded of cavalry, they returned to their original position by the

ponds, and took, apparently, no farther notable part in the action.

At 4 P. M., the hour at which some authors state the battle became general, the Spanish infantry of the right wing charged the Austrian centre, and broke through its first line, but was repulsed by the second and forced back gradually, by numbers superior at the point of decision. After sunset, 3 battalions of Walloon infantry, of the Spanish extreme right, under General Jauche, tired of their inaction throughout the day, advanced to charge the opposing right of the Allies, refused. Gages inconsiderately recalled them, but, almost simultaneously, perceiving what important effects might result from this movement, he commanded Jauche to resume the offensive, and ordered up the rest of the infantry of his left wing to support the Walloons. These battalions, advancing by echelons, mistook each other in the twilight for enemies, commenced firing upon each other, and did not discover the error until they had mutually inflicted a very heavy loss. This accident, very common to such movements with young troops, may explain why our battles have been fought on first principles in continuous lines, and without attempts at manœuvring.

Meanwhile the Spanish right, which had been worsted several hours before, was thoroughly beaten, the country houses, buildings, and positions about the ponds carried, and one battalion captured.

Why Traun did not press home and destroy the Spaniards, who continued to retreat across the river during the night by moonlight, and broke down their bridge behind them, can only be explained by the fact that his infantry, which had marched, manœuvred and fought the whole day, were completely fagged out, and that his

cavalry, thoroughly beaten in the morning, were not in hand, condition or spirits.

He lost 1,703 dead; wounded and prisoners; among these 2 generals killed, and 2 wounded. Strange to say the Spaniards had also 2 generals killed and 2 wounded, 1,755 killed, 1,397 wounded and 824 prisoners. Traun's report reads that his total casualties did not exceed 1,200, and that many stragglers rejoined him within the next few days: He estimated the losses of de Gages in, and in consequence of, this defeat, as high as 6,000, half his force present, according to Von Kausler. Gages who enjoyed a great reputation in his day, deserves but little credit for his dispositions in this battle; and fought it very badly. There were orders and counter orders, and as usual, consequent disorders throughout. Nevertheless he showed great calmness and soldiership in the manner in which he effected his retreat. As some excuse for the Spanish Marshal, it is well to remember that "having received repeated commands to miss no opportunity of attacking the enemy," he acted as too many Generals have done under similar circumstances, obeyed blindly and failed. Gages fought "more with a view to satisfy the court in Madrid, than perhaps with the hope of any splendid result." No administration in a capital can or should attempt to direct movements in the field. Such guidance is beyond the scope of mortality's reason and vision.

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Notwithstanding his successes, malign influences soon after led to Traun's resigning the command in Italy, where he had conducted affairs with so much ability and glory. Schlosser insinuates that Traun had been eminently successful, and states that he "might also have taken Naples," if affairs had been left to his sole direction,

and if "a General of *distinguished rank* (equivalent under the Austrian administration to a political appointee in the U. S.) had not arrived (to replace him), instead of one of very great abilities."

Perhaps, more properly speaking, under-currents of intrigue as well as public clamor, both so potential in this country, led to Traun's recall. Military writers ascribe it to his determined refusal not to adventure into a hostile and difficult country, occupied by far superior forces, and imperil his communications with his base of supplies, until furnished with adequate means to carry out orders received as well as his own plans. If this was the reason it reflects the more honor on Traun. How seldom will a general or official relinquish high positions until compelled to do so. We, however, have recently seen notable examples in the generous Burnside and intrepid Hooker. Common history attributes Traun's supersedure to the clamors of allies who desired protection without being willing to bear any share of the burthens imposed by the presence of their protectors; to the slanders always occasioned by the conduct of an upright leader, whose liberality base men style, to suit their purposes, prodigality, and whose economy, avarice; and to the jealousy of inferior merit of equal rank but subordinate position. Have our generals and armies witnessed no striking instances of the success of such concurring influences? At all events, one or all of these combined (as more than once during this war at home) occasioned Traun's resignation or recall. Before he left Italy the King of Sardinia addressed him a most elegant letter of commendation, and added his own portrait set with diamonds to the value of \$12,000.

Thus highly honored, by the King of Sardinia, whose general's jealousy had latterly neutralized Traun's

science, Traun hastened to throw himself at the feet of his Empress-Queen, and demand a most searching enquiry into his official conduct. Maria Theresa raised her gallant defender with the remark "I think of you as I do of every honest man," and bestowed upon him the order of the golden fleece, the highest honor in her power. This was in January, 1744. The same month he was made General-in-Chief in Bohemia and Moravia, the bulwarks of Austria against the encroachments of Prussia.

Then, when Khevenhuller died, 26th Jan'y, of the same year, 1744, she sent him to occupy that great general's place as counsellor and assistant to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief on the Rhine, Prince Charles of Lorraine, who enjoys the fame which Traun alone deserves and acquired for his superior. To Prince Charles, Traun acted at once as Chief of his Staff, and military adviser (*AD LATUS* is the proper term or *ALTER EGO*) and held in regard to his general the same relation that Hess occupied under Radetsky in 1848-'9 in Italy, and under the present Emperor of Austria, in the Solferino campaign. In fact in the ensuing campaigns, Austrian military annalists indicate Traun as the actual planner, motor and director, even where they write of the operations in which the Prince himself commanded. We now enter upon that year and a half of *PRACTICAL STRATEGY* which entitles *TRAUN* to particular attention, his greatest monument and his last efforts as a *GENERAL in the true sense of the word, not a mere fighter.*

As a preface to the narratives of these achievements, it will be well to consider what Schlosser, *THE Historian of the XVIII Century*, remarks in relation to Traun's instrumentality therein :

"Whilst the king, (Louis XV, of France,) began his



operations in the Netherlands, Count TRAUN in reality made an admirable campaign on the Rhine, and Prince Charles (brother of the Archduke Francis, *Grand Duke of Tuscany*, afterwards the Emperor Francis I., of Austria, and husband of Maria Theresa,) also, at least according to the newspapers and histories of those times, whose peculiar vocation and purpose it was to flatter their rulers.

Traun had been recalled from Italy, where he had gathered his laurels at Campo Santo, and sent as an assistant to prince Charles, who knew much better how to help himself at table and to the bottle, than in the field," and "by lending his name, sometimes to General Brown and sometimes to General Traun, did much more evil than good." "Frederick II (the great) remarks, with great justice, that Austria treated Traun ('who received the command of the grand army which bore the name of the Prince of Lorraine') very ungratefully on this occasion. Not the slightest mention had hitherto been made of him in the public reports. Lobkowitz (*a prince*) was sent to Italy to gather the laurels which he had really won, and he was only sent back into Italy after he had commanded in two admirably well conducted campaigns on the Rhine and in Bohemia (in 1744 and 1745), on which occasion also no public notice whatever was taken of his services. Even the Austrian official historian, who gives an account of every year of this war in a thick octavo volume, composed in the most repulsive chancery style, ventures gently to hint, that the court party, in the year 1744, had behaved with great injustice to the valiant Traun."

"There was a general expectation," testifies the court historiographer, "that the house of Austria had found in this valiant general some compensation for the loss of

Khevenhuller. Even the queen acted *as if she placed her whole reliance on him*. For that reason, I know not why it is that so little is heard since then of that brave gentleman. In the accounts from the army there is scarcely any allusion to him, which circumstance gives rise to much conjecture."

Compare these remarks with what is becoming history around us. Has the favoritism of despotic rule found its counterpart or parallel in the favoritism of popular government? Has the expiring influence of the Aulic Council of Vienna, and of the Camarilla of Madrid, or the proscription and partiality of the Cabal of Charles II, of the Seggi of Naples, or of the Ten of Venice, revived with like mysterious and ubiquitous power under Democratic institutions? That there was already a strong resemblance some years since, the following occurrence will prove :

An Austrian military officer or agent was in conversation with one of our most distinguished generals, since gloriously dead upon the battle field, sacrificed by a popular appointee. The latter had commenced to explain how it was that generalships in this country were confided to influential civilians, instead of meritorious men of military education, reputation or experience, when the foreigner made the following reply: "I understand it. In Austria chief commands are destined for the princes of the blood and high aristocracy; in the United States they are given to political magnates and favorites of the administration in power: merit or services are not taken into consideration in either country unless compulsorily. The principle is the same."

Thus extremes meet, and the people everywhere sacrificed. As Napoleon remarked, "There is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous." This war was to

have broken the fetters politicians had imposed upon the people. Has it done so as yet? Has it not riveted their yoke upon the patriotic, industrial, producing middle classes.

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In April, 1744, Traun led the Austrian army, 40 to 60,000 strong in four columns out of their winter quarters in the camp at Heilbronn, on the Neckar, where Prince Charles had concentrated and organized them and settled upon the plan of operations, and then crossed the Neckar in order to invade Alsace. The French army under Marshal de Coigny, 60 battalions and 100 squadrons strong, which extended along the west bank of the river from Gemersheim (50 miles, air line, below Strasburg) to Worms; on the 30th July, drew together and united itself with the Bavarian army. In order to mislead the French in regard to his plan of crossing over the Rhine into Alsace, which, with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief Prince, Charles of Lorraine, was known only to Generals Traun and Nadasdy, the army made various demonstrations and appeared to wish to attempt the passage at different points but especially in the neighborhood of Stockstadt and Ketsch (village, east bank, one-third distance from Spires to Mannheim.) The operation was also, in appearance, actually carried out in the neighborhood of Stockstadt and General Barenklau threw a bridge across an arm of the Rhine. Prince Charles made at the same time a movement, as if it was his intention to pass over the Neckar and effect a junction with Barenklau. The Marshal de Coigny, deceived by this manœuvre, made the double mistake, that he sent the Bavarian Field Marshal Seckendorf over the Rhine, in order to undertake the defence of the river between Spires and Lauterburg, (west shore, 34 miles N. E. of Strasburg,) and that he himself

broke up his camp and marched off with army to Worms and Frankenthal, instead of posting, as he should have done, the united French-Bavarian army, at least 76,000 strong, between the rivers Queich and Speyerbach, while he stretched out a line of small detachments from Fort Louis, midway between Strasburg and Lauterburg, to Philipsburg.

As soon as Prince Charles and Field Marshal Traun received news of these erroneous movements, they expedited the order to General Nadasdy to send, at the village of Schroeck (east shore, 10 miles, S. by W. of Philipsburg), now known as Leopoldshafen, 2,000 Croats in skiffs over the Rhine. These, under the known partisan Trenck, surprised on the French, left or opposite, shore three Bavarian regiments posted there, and converted the confusion occasioned by their unexpected appearance into precipitate flight. Nadasdy himself, meanwhile, at the head of 9,000 Hussars, crossed the main stream, whilst the engineers were most diligently occupied behind him in finishing the pontoon bridges already commenced.

At the first alarm and news of this passage, Seckendorf indeed hastened thither with his whole army, but instead of boldly attacking Nadasdy, before the Prince of Waldeck with the infantry could join him, he was satisfied with wasting the precious time in indecisive and half-hearted encounters, until he received the news of Coigny's retreat to Landau, whereupon he fell back thither, through Gernersheim, fearing lest he should be entirely cut off from the French main army.

Meanwhile General Barenklau with his corps had likewise crossed over the Rhine in the neighborhood of Mayence, and the Austrian main army had perfected their pontoon bridges so that, on the 3d July, the whole

of Prince Charles' forces had been transferred to the French side of the river.

Thus was the forever memorable passage of the Rhine by the Austrians (in 1744), in the face of the French and Bavarians, carried out without loss. Prince Charles truly acquired thereby the amplest renown, but in it our Traun assuredly had the greater merit. With these very significant words Joseph Freyherrn Von Hormayr, author of the Austrian Plutarch, closes his succinct account. He, a most reliable, has hitherto been the chief authority for this exploit.

For those readers, who are fond of details, the following description has been collected from the best authorities and maps, particularly Zedler's Lexicon and Fessler's compilation of "Nadasdy's Relation," embodied in the "History and Achievements of Maria Theresa," the very work which concedes that Austrian officials were so unjust to Traun:

On the 19th-29th May, 1744, Charles of Lorraine with a mighty army, commenced his march from Heilbronn to the Rhine, where for him and his Ad-latus TRAUN, actually chief, nominally second in command, the hero FRANZ NADASDY, and the Hungarian contingent under his command, imperishable laurels were prepared.

He proved his military ability by his victorious campaign upon, and passage over the Rhine. On the west bank of that river stood Marshal COIGNY who had pledged his head to his king (Louis XV) that, so long as he retained the command, no Austrian should live to plant his foot on the French side.

His army was stretched out from Oppenheim (about 15 miles above Mayence) below, to Spires (40 miles, not counting the bends of the river) above, while, midway, at Worms, 10,000 men were encamped who furnished garri-

sons for all the intervening posts. Meanwhile from Hunningen (just below Basle) to Spires [an arc of over 150 miles] a chain of militia sentinels, posted 100 paces apart, maintained a constant watch. SECKENDORF had assembled the remainder of the Bavarian Army from their scattered cantonments and established them on the east shore of the Rhine under the protection of field works and the strong fortress of Philipsburg. But when Barenklau and Prince Anthony Eszterhazy moved forward with the advance guard of 14,000 Infantry and 18,000 Cavalry to Stockstadt, and the entire Austrian army had been augmented, according to various estimates, to 60, and even to 90,000 men, Seckendorf, continually harassed by Nadasdy, saw himself compelled to transport his forces over the Rhine and unite them with those under Coigny. This was on the 27th June. After he had encamped around Germersheim [3 to 6 miles W. by S. of Philipsburg] and Modersheim, the French moved from Spires down [25 miles] to Worms and Oppenheim [about two thirds distance to Mayence.] The horses of Marshal Coigny were kept saddled night and day, and the vigilance of his troops seemed a certain assurance of the frustration of the enemy's plans.

But Franz Nadasdy felt certain of the success of a plan claimed to have been his conception. The time and place of carrying it out was likewise a secret and left to Traun and him. Prince Charles was the only other individual except Traun cognizant of the projected operations, and, devoid of envy and jealousy, its liberal promoter. Eight days previous the Austrian troops had been occupied in, to spies and strangers, unintelligible marches and counter-marches, thereby, as well as through false reports of deserters and traitors, to deceive Coigny and Seckendorf.

After Nadasdy had made all the necessary preparation,

Col., Adjutant-General, Count OSTEIN, on the evening of the 30th June, invited the foreign embassies and nobility of Mayence to a grand ball, at which Barenklau and Joseph Eszterhazy were purposely and conspicuously present. On the same evening Prince Charles of Lorraine gave a costly collation to his Marshals, Generals and Colonels. At this entertainment, as well as that given by Ostein, nothing else was talked about except the difficulty and impossibility of the passage of a river so strongly defended as the Rhine. Meanwhile they paid no attention to the attentive spies and listeners, who were not wanting at either feast, and assuredly would convey such consoling news as speedily as possible to the enemy. Barenklau and Eszterhazy stole opportunely away from Ostein's well-drunken company and Prince Charles distributed sealed orders to the commanders departing from him about midnight, with directions to open them at the sound of the first signal gun and fulfill them instantly and upon the spot. At daybreak on Wednesday, the 1st July, the thunder of six cannons gave the signal for carrying out a Master-piece of Tactics, the greatest perhaps of the century. The assembled divisions between Neudorf and Graben [villages 5 to 10 miles S. S. E. of Philipsburg] commenced their movements at once. Not a man failed in his company, rank or place; yet no one knew whither he was going or whither he was to be led. The forced march was directed upon the village Schroeck [right bank, a poor village, now Leopoldshafen] opposite the town Rheinzaberen. Already Nadasdy, to whom the execution of the movement had been confided, stood upon the bank of the river. Confidence of success shone in his eye and was stamped upon his features. Around him were grouped his subordinates, who placed as implicit confidence in him as he did in the concerted plan. Count Puebla,

Strasoldo, Desoelfy, Forgacs, Botta and Moroetz. Under the command of Trenck, 1,300 Pandours took the initiative. These Pandours were light infantry, clad in the old Turkish costume; sometimes, a kind of light cavalry. Upwards of 160 large boats lashed together into flying bridges, mounted with 8 field pieces, had been prepared to carry them over. The Pandours pushed ahead. The first attack had been assigned to them. The enemy's shore was defended by 5,400 Dragoons, who fired a few shots but the furious onset of the terrible, disembarking Pandours, and their wild cry of Allah! Allah! first heard in this war, under Christian leaders, upon the great German river, frightened the French out of their lines, and three of their works were captured.

"And one enormous shout of "Allah!" rose  
 In the same moment, loud as even the roar  
 Of war's most martial engines, to their foes  
 Hurling defiance: city, stream and shore  
 Resounded "Allah!" and the clouds which close  
 With thickening canopy the conflict o'er,  
 Vibrate to the Eternal Name. Hark! through  
 All sounds it pierceth; "Allah! Allah! Hu!"

In crowds the glorious Magyar leaders led their Hungarians, Carlstaders (South-western Croats), Warasdiners (North-eastern Croats), and Talpatches (Hungarian foot from the Koros district), savage, danger and death despising troops, to reinforce the Pandours. 250 Hussars rowed, separately, in small boats across the river (here about 1200 feet wide with a strong current), and by 5, A. M., not a single Frenchman remained upon the shore. The brave Austrians were masters of it and the adjoining wood. In the meanwhile thousands, with unremitting labor, worked upon the main bridges of boats, which were completed about mid-day. In the space of 8 hours, 15 legions of Cavalry and Infantry had passed over, and by the next morning the rest of the foot and horse were established on the French shore of the Rhine.



The second point of passage, according to Nadasdy's plan, approved by Traun, for the crossing of the Rhine, was 62 to 70 English miles below Schroeck, near Biberich (right, east shore), about 5 English miles below Mayence. Fortunately, without the loss of a man, Barenklau and Joseph Eszterhazy solved on the same day the difficult military problem confided to them. On Tuesday they ordered 3,000 Croats and Hussars over the Mayn at Kostheim, to seize every thing available as means of transport above Mayence which they could discover by land or by water. At 10, P. M., they reached the Rhine at Wolfen, not far from Biberich, with a great number of boats, rafts and whatever would float, which they had brought with them out of the Mayn.

Gustavus Adolphus, when he crossed the Rhine at Enfelden, a little above Oppenheim, so gloriously, in the teeth of the Spaniards, Dec. 7, 1631, is said to have been ferried over on a barn door; his troops made the passage singing a psalm.

By means of the appliances collected, the Croats and Hussars transported themselves across the river [1500 to 1700 feet in width with a stronger current than above where Nadasdy passed] and heralded their approach to the French shore by their terrific and peculiar shout of victory Urli! Urli! The French outposts were either put to flight or cut to pieces. A signal, by means of rockets and cannon shots, announced their successful crossing to their associates above at Neustadt and Philipsburg. At 4 A. M., Wednesday, they marched upon the draw of the bridge of boats [1666 feet long] opposite Mayence at the Carthausenhofe. About 4 P. M., Barenklau and Eszterhazy led over 10,000 men, artillery, equipages and bag-

gage. On the 2d July, Prince Charles of Lorraine and Traun crossed with the rest of the troops above Mannheim.

This, and numberless other instances, prove that large rivers are by no means impassable barriers for any country. This Napoleon admits. No great army, ably commanded and supplied with commensurate pontoon trains and bridge resources, can be prevented from passing an ordinary sized river even by an army equal in numbers and under good officers. The only explanation for this apparently strange result is that OFFENCE *has always the advantage of* DEFENCE, since it can choose its time, place and opportunity.

In headlong career of victory, the Austrian army pressed forward, overran a great part of Alsace, and threatened Lorraine. Traun stood ready for decisive action in the neighborhood of Strasburg, when a courier dashed up to the headquarters and announced that in consequence of the Frankfort Convention, of the 13th May, 1744, Bohemia had again been invaded by the Prussian armies.— This was the opening scene of the Second Silesian War, from which Frederic issued triumphant the ensuing year, although as will be shown, Traun traversed his first moves and rendered almost nugatory his first campaign. On the 21st August, a Council of War was summoned, composed of Traun, the Senior Generals of Infantry and Cavalry and Field-Marshal-Lieutenants. Unanimously these decided upon a retreat over the Rhine.

To effect this repassage, however, without loss, was a much harder task than to resolve upon it, since the French and Bavarians counted 116,000 men, including 40,000 picked troops, brought up from the Netherlands. The Austrians, according to Cust's "Annals of the Wars," had only 70,000, whose actual commander, fortunately for them, was Traun. The Allies were under three French

and one Bavarian Marshal. All of these had distinguished themselves at one period or another. Coigny received his baton for his brilliant victory of Guastalla, in 1734; Noailles, as wise in council as brave in the field, for many distinguished services, particularly at the siege of Philipsburg in 1734; Belleisle, indomitable and fertile in resources, never can nor should be forgotten for his wonderful retreat from Prague, 1742-'3; Seckendorf had been created Field Marshal chiefly for successes gained over two of his associates, Coigny and Belleisle, in 1735, after which he displayed at times real ability by his re-conquest of Bavaria in 1742, and operations against Traun's predecessor, Khevenhuller. Perhaps one cause of Traun's decided success was this coalition of military magnates, either of whom would have been more dangerous alone.

It was plain then to foresee that the French would follow up the first movement of retreat with all their forces and take advantage of the first favorable opportunity to fall with superior numbers upon the Austrian army or at least upon one or more of its dislocated columns. This circumstance made the greatest caution necessary. The Austrians had to be prepared not only to resist, but also to be able to meet each attack with an energetic counter-buff. On the other side celerity was no less urgent than prudence in conducting this retreat, since the Bavarians, under Seckendorf, had made all possible preparations to get ahead of the Austrians, and, by the destruction of their bridges, cut off their return to Germany.

On the 15th of August, the heavy baggage began to defile in retreat. Swiftly and altogether unexpectedly to the enemy, the army followed and fell back across the Zoor (affluent West of Rhine) before the French could come up with it. At Benheim (W. shore, 25 N. N. E. of Strasburg) near Selz, 21st-23d August, the Austrians

drew up in order of battle, and invited a conflict which the three French Marshals "to the amazement of all Europe did not" dare to accept.

To General Daun had been confided the command of the van-guard of grenadiers to assure the passage of the river and now again to his resolution was assigned the command of the rear-guard, consisting of one infantry (grenadier) and two dragoon regiments, to cover the retreat. This Daun was afterwards Frederic the Great's successful antagonist at Kollin in 1757, and that monarch's unsuccessful opponent at Hochkirehen in 1758, and at Liegnitz and Torgau in 1760. Protected by a morass he gallantly repulsed the attack of the French vanguard. In this campaign another great Austrian General, afterwards Field Marshal Laudon, was serving under the notorious Trenck. He distinguished himself, and was shot through and through the chest and shoulder blade, a button of his dolman accompanying the ball.

Meanwhile Traun, on the night of the 23d-24th August, transported the whole Austrian army, over his pontoon bridges, to the east bank of the Rhine. Before break of day, 4 P. M., 24th August, the return passage was safely accomplished, and the bridges broken up. The same day the Austrians encamped at Ottersdorf; a small village, nearly opposite Benheim, 5 miles W. of Rastadt, on Baden soil, whence with "incredible expedition" Traun advanced to Donauwerth, 50 miles N. W. of Munich.

Much is to be observed here. On the one hand this passage and re-passage of the Rhine presents strong points of resemblance to the crossing and re-crossing of the Rappahannock, before and after Fredericksburg, 1st and 2d, and Chancellorsville. All these were achieved successfully in the face of a superior or equal enemy, prepared to resist and pursue. It is nothing new, it is thus

proved, to cross and re-cross great rivers safely, in the presence and against the will of an experienced, active, and determined opponent. But, on the other hand, contrast Daun's successful defence, with three regiments and without field works, against a very numerous army, with the abandonment of more than one fortified position by our commanders, although at the head of garrisons, but little inferior in numbers to the assailing or menacing force.— A brave and successful maintenance of a post is a great glory to an officer and often of incalculable importance to a co-operating army.

At Donauwerth on the 9th Sept. Prince Charles relinquished the command-in-chief, nominally his, of the army to Count Traun, always in reality its actual commander. This latter led his troops by forced marches by the way of Ratisbon, on the Danube, to Bruck, near Waldmunchen, on the frontier of Bohemia and road to Pilsen. He reached this point on the 22d Sept., having accomplished from 250 to 300 miles in 29 days. On his passage through the Upper Palatinate he laid this district under contribution. On reaching the frontier of Bohemia, he made his dispositions to free the kingdom from the victorious Prussians. These invaders had, meanwhile captured its capital, Prague, 16th Sept. 1744, and compelled the city a second time, to do homage to Charles VII, the psuedo-Bavaro-elector-emperor.

This campaign has been considered at length in Chap. IX of Frederic's "History of my own Time." To his pages reference should be had. In it the practical-strategic genius of Traun developed itself against the great King and shone in its fullest brilliancy. "My grand army," said Frederic, "which was to have swallowed up Bohemia and to have overrun Austria, met with the fate

that befel the invincible armada of Philip II of Spain."—  
 "All the advantages of this campaign were for the Austrians, M. de Traun played therein the part of Sertorius and the King that of Pompey. The conduct of M. de Traun was a model of perfection." What more could be said.

Frederic the Great has recorded his testimony that it is more difficult to carry on a war in Bohemia than anywhere else in Middle Europe.

Bohemia is an irregular quadrilateral enclosed by four mighty chains of granite mountains. The Ore mountains, on the N. W., separate it from Saxony; the Giant mountains, on the N. E., divide it from Silesia; and the Pine and Forest mountains on the S. W., swell up between it and Bavaria and Austria. On the fourth side the Sudetic range, from which the Giant mountains run off towards the N. W., throw out a branch, the Sunken mountains, which forms the S. E. boundary. These uniting with the Forest mountains interpose between Bohemia and Moravia, and Lower Austria. The spurs of all these chains run in and together and through each other towards Prague as a central point in a net work of ridges which, whether lower or loftier, are always rude in their climate, rugged in their aspect, unproductive in their soil, and intersected by streams subject to furious freshets. In fact this kingdom or province will scarcely yield to any portion of the U. S. in roughness of surface except the strip of the Alleghanies, proper, in Virginia. The central triangle between the Elbe and the Moldau, the scene of Traun's successful strategic operations, if not as mountainous as the districts encompassing it, is nevertheless equally difficult because the valleys are irregular and subject to overflows. A birds eye view would present as diversified a country as defence could desire. Ponds,

marshes, streams, rivers, brush, woods, forests, ravines, tortuous valleys, heights, isolated conical mountains crowned by old castles, and spurs of mountain ranges mingle therein confusedly. Consequently those who may imagine that Torstenson and Hatzfeld, Traun and Frederick had an easier chess-board to make their moves upon, than our Generals had to play their game on, err greatly. Readers could indicate few stages for operations which an ordinary General would not have selected in preference.

August 13th, 1744, Frederic entered Bohemia with 84,000 men; September 16th he took Prague after a ten days siege. He then captured Tabor, Budweiss, and other towns and made himself master of all Bohemia east of the Moldau. General Batthyani with 28,000 regulars and about 6,000 Croats, Hussars, and Grœnitzern (Soldiers from the Military Frontier) had been unable to interrupt his operations or stop his progress. Even Vienna began to tremble and to prepare against a siege. Suddenly Traun showed himself near Pisek on the flanks of the Prussians and manifested an intention to interpose his forces between the Prussians and the Sasawa and cut them off from Prague. Oct. 2d, Traun had united his columns with those of Batthyani near Mirotitz, 50 miles S. S. W. of Prague. Their combined troops amounted to about 60,000 men. Besides these, Traun had a large force of Hungarian partisans, wherewith to harass the enemy. Taking alarm, Frederic at once commenced falling back on Prague, but, as he admits, did not concentrate all his forces as he should have done. He even committed the great error of leaving garrisons behind in Tabor and Budweiss. Simultaneously Traun struck at Frederic's communications and pounced upon his outlying posts. By the 3d Oct., Tabor and Budweiss had been

taken with upwards of 3,000 good soldiers, besides invalids, and already Traun's vanguard was hastening forward to occupy the important post of Beneschau. This place lies midway on the road from Tabor, 25 miles S. E. of Prague. The possession of this almost inexpugnable position could have determined the fate of the war and of the Prussian forces. Fortunately for them, their Field-Marshal Schwerin had already won and occupied it with 15,000 men, before the coming up of the Austrians. On the 14th Oct. the King himself, reinforced his Lieutenant. Forestalled by Schwerin, Traun fell back to Neweclow, about 8 miles, W. S. W., and, thence, to Marschowitz, 2 or 3 miles to the S. E. again. Here, Oct. 22d, Traun was joined by 20 or 22,000 Saxons under the Duke of Sax-Weissenfels. Frederic received these tidings with great pleasure. Chagrined at the loss of Tabor and Budweiss and the failure of his great plans he confessed that he was in hopes that the hour for vengeance had arrived. His army, in eight columns, marched Oct. 24th, P. M. to seek out the enemy. By roads or paths never before traversed by troops they toiled forward. At night fall they arrived upon a heighth less than a mile distant from the Austrians, and drew up in order of battle in full sight of their lines. It is difficult to reconcile the different accounts of the numerical force of either army in presence. Still Frederic certainly had about 70,000 men, and the Austrians not much over that number. The Prussians have been estimated at from 60 to 70,000 men, the Austrians from 75 to 90,000.

Traun, as a rule, put little confidence in Fortune. He knew the jade was often accustomed to play an unlucky trick with the most beautiful projects, and cut, with unexpected slash, through and across the web of the most



skillful plans. Phryne-like, she, oftener, in preference, inspired a young impetuous warrior with conceptions, the sources of victory, than an old, reflecting and experienced hero, such as himself, grown gray in arms. Consequently he determined to avoid the offered battle on which the fate of Bohemia and Bavaria depended. The night passed in dispositions in accordance with this resolve.

The next morning, at break of day, Frederic and his principal officers were out to reconnoitre their enemy. They found that he had entirely changed the position of his camp. Traun was now posted opposite the right flank of the Prussians, upon an almost precipitous height. At the foot of this elevation stretched a marshy bottom, intersected by a miry stream. These impediments separated the two armies. In this direction Traun was entirely unassailable. An extensive screen of brush wood afforded cover for the examination of Traun's right. It was as advantageously posted as his left. The most accurate reconnoissances demonstrated that Traun's position was altogether unsusceptible of any successful attack. Dearth of provisions constrained Frederic to retreat.— Still more out of humor than when he advanced, he fell back again to Beneschau. At once Traun was in movement and followed him up close. This is an example of the practical strategy which steadily pressed Frederic back and out of Bohemia.

At Beneschau, Frederic, in turn, assumed an equally advantageous position. Maladies and privations of all kinds, and scarcity of food and forage, soon constrained him to abandon it. Traun, thereupon, passed over the Sasawa, affluent E. of Moldau, at Kammerburg, 25 miles S. E. of Prague, and directed his march on Janowitz.— This village lies in the direction of, and midway to, Ozaslau. There Frederic had been victorious in 1742, ten-

minated the First Silesian War, and ratified his claims to Silesia with the sword. Janowitz or Janikau was no less memorable. It was the scene of Torstenson's greatest victory, just 99 years previous, in 1645. Here the crippled Swede, litter-borne, defeated the Emperor's best general and destroyed his last army. Traun, in whom was reflected the genius of "under Sweden's throne, Sweden's greatest commander" was reversing the picture. Under Torstenson, the Prussians had assisted in humiliating Austria. Austria, by Traun, was now humbling the aggrandizement of Prussia. At Czaslau, near by, Prince Charles, now Traun's nominal superior, had been defeated, and had lost Silesia for his sister-in-law. Traun was now causing double blushes and confusion of faces. Prince Charles had cause to blush at the inferiority of his generalship to that of Traun, successful on the very fields which had witnessed his failure. Frederic at his impotence in the presence of the veteran Marshal, victorious without fighting, through practical strategy, in the name of the very superior, over whom he had triumphed at the cost of such exertion and bloodshed.—

The Austrian partisan corps swarmed out in every direction. No stingless drones were they. They followed hard upon the heels of the retreating Prussians and dogged their every movement. They prevented the arrival of supplies of every kind and intercepted couriers and mails. At one period the king was four weeks without receiving intelligence from Prague or news of what was passing in the rest of Europe. Take one instance of their ubiquitous on-falls. One night about 9 P. M., amid the rain and pitch-darkness, the King was startled in the suburbs of Kollin by the cymbals and barbarous Turkish music of Trenck's Pandours. The next moment the

neighboring houses burst into a blaze and from the adjacent windows issued a sharp fire of musketry. Meanwhile Trenck had diverted the course of a rivulet and, by midnight, the horses of the Prussians were in water up to their bellies. All the while musketry and light field pieces were playing upon them. The Prussians were incapable of defence. Horses and men were falling every minute. In a short time all, Frederic himself included, would have been taken prisoners. Suddenly the attack slackened. A cannon ball had crushed Trenck's foot. He was carried off and, almost simultaneously, the firing ceased. As Frederic left Kollin he remarked to the Trenck in his service, "Your terrible cousin might have given us a severe blow last night." This was one of the King's many remarkable escapes.

Throughout this retreat the Austrian light troops continued to provoke the Prussians by continual skirmishes and night attacks. Partial encounters were incessant, but not the slightest opportunity was afforded to bring on a general engagement. Bad weather, wretched roads and the want of necessaries engendered camp maladies. Unremitting fatigue augmented the sufferings.—

—"look on yonder camp!

Behold whole heaps of dead, without one wound!  
Behold, how like the dead the living look!  
So near their end, that they who wait their friends  
To the last rites, are burnt on the same pile!  
The sturdy" troops "unsinew'd by diseases,  
That firmly went, impressing deep the ground  
On which they trod, with their large lusty strides,  
Now scarcely crawl, supported on their arms."

Not 100 soldiers in each regiment were free from dysenteries; the officers were as badly off as the men. Traun seemed resolved to destroy the Prussians by famine. Famine, however, was even beforehand with the enemy. Frederic was caught as it were in a net. He had only the unpleasant choice between Bohemia and Silesia. If

Frederic made up his mind to maintain himself in Prague, he must give up all his communications with Silesia and his own kingdom. If he turned aside towards Pardubitz, on the main road to Silesia, Prague and Bohemia were lost; Bohemia would be delivered from every detachment of the Prussian invaders.

In the present work it is needless to go farther into details. Frederic neglected nothing to compel the Field Marshal to accept a battle. He forbore no manœuvre to avert or avoid the inevitable alternative which Traun prescribed for his acceptance. Traun never assumed a position susceptible of successful attack. Frederic had per force to retire in obedience to Traun's pressure.— Miseries which every day augmented in his army, compelled Frederic to fall back over the Elbe. On the 29th November, he recrossed that river and placed his troops in cantonments. Prague had already been disgracefully evacuated, on the 26th.

The surprise at Colonitz (Solonitz or Teinitz, on the Elbe) on the 19th November, the last encounter, was one of the most aggravating incidents of the campaign. In spite of all the King's proverbial caution and watchfulness, this surprise was planned and carried out by Traun with even as much cunning as good fortune. Its result was the entire evacuation of Bohemia by the Prussians. Conquered without a battle Frederic exclaimed, "I might have made with advantage to myself a couple of campaigns under Traun." Scrutinize and compare. Will any one deny that measured by the standard of Frederic, the generalship of Gilmore and Rosecrans comes nearest, in its peculiarities to the practical strategy of Traun.

This anecdote leads to reflections the pen cannot refrain from expressing. War was a very different thing in Traun's days from what it is now. There was a re-

splendency and exhilaration, an actual elevation in the military service then, which could not but exercise a magic influence upon any one inclined to enterprise and excitement. There was even an elegance in the career of the soldier. Some of the best spirit of chivalry still lingered about it. The campaigns of Frederic and his contemporaries opposed in the arena races which it required almost half a century and the vast, aggressive, maelstrom-influence of Napoleon to draw, and whirl, and confuse in the maddening churm of battle upon the same fields. When Traun commanded, the God of battles was invoked, in opposing arms, by every great faith, and sect, and schism, from the Yellow Sea to the Atlantic. All the most picturesque, and dazzling, and bizarre costumes mingled in the strife; while music, discordant to attuned ears, but breathing harmony to the untutored semi-savage warrior, made itself heard amid the rattling of musketry, and the dissimilar commands of conflicting multitudes, while

"Sounds of horror chime

In, like church bells, with sigh, howl, groan, yell, prayer."

to the

"diapason of the cannonade."

Never again, will an European commander hear that wild Turkish music with which Trenck's Pandours and Talpatches startled Frederic amid the flames of Kollin. In our war, the days of old Tilly seem to revive before us, and "a ragged soldier but a bright musket" present themselves in review, instead of the gay uniforms and clean persons and elegant carriage it required so many years and lucid minds to introduce, maintain, simplify and utilize.

These movements and counter-movements recall a passage from Sir Walter Scott's "Legend of Montrose" which is exactly apposite, if it be justifiable to make comedy the

exponent of tragedy. The comparison between the relative positions, and actions of Captain Dalgetty and the "Man with the Axe" and of Frederic, who sought to take advantage of an unguarded moment on the part of Maria Theresa, and of Traun, who represents the axe bearing guard, are so ridiculously alike that it is impossible to forbear quoting the paragraph.

"Accordingly, when all was quiet, he (Frederic) opened his chamber-door, (Saxony) and prepared to leave it, when he saw his friend with the axe (Traun) advancing towards him from the distant end of the gallery (Circles upon the Rhine,) half whistling, half humming, a Gaelic (Magyar) tune. To have shown any want of confidence, would have been at once impolitic, and unbecoming his military character, so the Captain, putting the best face upon his situation he could, whistled a Swedish retreat, in a tone still louder than the notes of his sentinel; and retreating pace by pace, with an air of indifference, as if his only purpose had been to breathe a little fresh air, he shut the door (Frontiers of Silesia) in the face of his guard (Traun) when the fellow had approached within a few paces of him."

"Thus ended this campaign of 1744," (to use the very words of Lord Dover, Towers, Campbell, and other historians and panegyrists of Frederic) "one of the most disastrous which ever befell the King of Prussia." "In his retreat he is stated to have lost above 30,000 men, together with 'all' his heavy baggage and artillery, and many wagons laden with provisions and plunder." "The General opposed to the king, Field-Marshal Traun, *who in fact commanded the army* of the Prince of Lorraine, was also, it must be confessed, a man of talent, and took advantage of whatever favorable circumstances presented themselves."

“The conduct of Marshal Traun, in this campaign,” remarks his opponent, “was a model of perfection, *which every military man who is fond of his profession, ought to study, in order to imitate it, if he has sufficient talents.*” The king himself allowed, that “this campaign was his school in the art of war, and that M. de Traun was his Preceptor.”

Jomini in his “Treatise on Grand Military Operations” remarks “This campaign did great honor to Traun who operated with as great sagacity while he was yet inferior in force to Frederic as he manœvered with ability, after he had been joined by Prince Charles, in order to compel the Prussians to abandon Bohemia. Then, without doubt he should have accomplished more, but he had an adversary who was not, like himself, subject to the Aulic Council.”

Traun achieved more than could have been expected of him under existing circumstances. Prince Charles of Lorraine “by lending his name to Général Traun, did much more evil than good.” “He knew much better how to help himself at table and to the bottle than in the field.” With Traun for ad-latus, Prince Charles achieved wonders; without him he accomplished nothing but preparing defeats for himself. With Traun in actual command of the armies which bore his name, Prince Charles won nothing but laurels, laurels withered by his defeat at Czaslau, in 1742, shrivelled and torn from his brow by his discomfitures at Hohen-Friedberg and Sohr, in 1745, and his inexcusable rout at Leuthen in 1757. Despite Prince Charles and the Aulic Council, Traun very nearly determined the fate of the war against Frederic. Oh, that Aulic Council, which has abased Austria, despite her glorious armies, from a first to a second rate power. Oh, that Camarilla of old fogyism, that Cabal of self sufficien-

cy and red-tape which appeared to exert itself only to bewilder and fetter Generals. Montecuculi is the only commander on record who had the moral courage to ignore the directions and advice expedited from Vienna.— When his campaigns were ended he carefully restored to the Aulic Counsellors their despatches and instructions *with the seals unbroken*. Would that our generals, in a free country, could repeat the practical strategy of Traun and imitate the resolution of Montecuculi.

On the 20th January, 1745, the Emperor Charles VII, who, in the attempt to acquire foreign states, lost his own, died. Expelled, led back, driven forth and brought in again, he expired, nevertheless, at last, in the castle of his ancestors at Munich. His son, Maximilian Joseph, warned by the sad fate of his father, acted more wisely and withstood the interested cajoleries of France and Prussia. April 28th, he subscribed the preliminaries of peace with Maria Theresa.

An election for Emperor was now to be held in the Imperial city of Frankfort on the Mayn. To guarantee freedom of choice to the German Electoral College, the remaining Austrian forces in Bavaria appeared under Traun in the circles of Suabia and Franconia. These, and the districts in which Traun operated, are now the kingdoms of Wurtemberg, and the smaller States immediately north of that kingdom and Bavaria, between the Lahn, N., and the Kocher, S.; the Fulda, Sinn, Mayn and Tauber, E., and the Rhine, W., particularly Electoral and Grand-ducal Hesse.

Even as he had commanded on the Rhine and in Bohemia, in 1744, in the name of Prince Charles, even so, in 1745, Traun exerted his talents in the name of his brother, the Arch-duke Francis, Grand Duke of Tuscany. Meanwhile the King of France and his generals had pledged



themselves to Frederic to oppose the election of the Archduke Francis, husband of Maria Theresa, even at the risk of a battle. Accordingly Louis XV sent a French army of 80,000 men, under Lieutenant-General the Prince of Conti, to threaten the assembled Electors. Conti, however little generalship he displayed in this campaign, had nevertheless shown considerable enterprise and ability in his operations against the Sardinians, among the Maritime Alps, in the preceding year, 1744.

Traun had from 30 to 40,000 troops. He concerted his plan of operations in perfect accordance with his accustomed mode of action. Without delivering a battle he achieved complete success by his Practical Strategy.

May 30th, 1745, Traun led his army in three grand divisions out of the Duchy of Neuburg, on the Danube, into Northern Wurtemberg. He first advanced, in the direction of Heilbronn, to Hall, on the Kocher, then he wheeled suddenly northwards and hastened by forced marches through Mergentheim, N. extremity of Wurtemberg, to the Mayn.

At the opening of the campaign, the Prince of Conti had disposed his army so as to dispute the passage of the Necar, in the expectation that the Austrians intended to cross this river. When, afterwards, he learned that instead of advancing westwards, Traun was in reality moving northwards, parallel to the Neckar, the French hurried, likewise in the same direction, by forced marches, into Hesse-Darmstadt, by a route parallel to that which they supposed the Austrians would take. Conti encamped on the plains near Umstadt, 10 miles E. of Darmstadt. The French had made this movement to get ahead of Traun and prevent his junction with the Austrian army-

corps, under Batthyani, coming up from the Netherlands and moving southwards to join him.

As all the places mentioned herein are laid down on Johnston's (Edinburgh) National Atlas, reference thereto will show that the position of Umstadt was not ill chosen; that thence Conti could manœuvre on Interior lines while Traun was moving by Exterior lines, almost on the arc of a circle of which Umstadt was the centre. Nevertheless Traun marched with such celerity, even on this circumference, that he was always ahead of the French. From Umstadt, Conti should have overwhelmed Batthyani before he crossed the Kinzig, and before Traun could join him, since the French were at the apex of a triangle, whose much shortest side stretched towards Batthyani and whose longest towards Traun.

Meanwhile Batthyani had already passed the Lahn, and was hastening on, by the way of Laubach and Birstein, towns lying almost in a direct line between Giessen, on the Lahn, and Salmunster, on the Kinzig. Laubach lies 15 miles S. E. of Giessen, in Hesse-Darmstadt; Birstein, in Hesse-Cassel, about the same distance N. W. of Orb, on the Orb, an affluent of the Kinzig, at the extreme north point of Bavaria.

Traun constantly moving on, made continual feints of attacking the Prince of Conti, last mentioned as encamped near Umstadt, and completely deceived him as to his intentions. Conti had advanced to Aschaffenburg, on the Mayn, about 12 miles N. E. of Umstadt and 23 miles E. S. E. of Frankfort. All at once Traun disappeared from before the French, in position there, and was lost to their reconnoissances and eclaireurs behind the screen of the forest-clad Spessart mountains.

This range, parallel to, and, here, north and yet west of the Mayn, stretches N. N. E. to the Kinzig, where it joins the western spurs of the Rhoengebirge. It formed a perfect blind. In like manner the Rebels have operated, protected and covered by the Blue Ridge. Down along the Shenandoah, again and again, Stonewall Jackson rolled his victorious torrent of war. Backwards and forwards, like a shuttle, rebel columns, a continual menace, shot to and fro through that valley while our armies lay on the Potomac from Alexandria upwards. Just so Lee turned Pope under cover of the Blue Ridge. Behind the double blind of the Bull Run and Kittoctan ranges and of the Blue Ridge, Lee again sought to deceive Hooker.

Having thus outmanœuvred his adversaries, Traun moved rapidly behind the leafy Spessart from Wertheim by the way of Lohr, both on the Mayn, to Urb or Orb, and united with Batthyani. With forces augmented by this junction, to 70,000 men, Traun now, in turn, offered battle again and again to Conti. He even detached Barenklau, who passed around the French left and crossed the Rhine at Biberich just below Mayence. The Prince of Conti took alarm at once and retreated hurriedly down the Mayn. So much was he afraid of the Austrians, that he blew up the bridge at Aschaffenburg and broke down that at Hoechst and fell back to Gross-Gerau near the Rhine. Traun passed the Mayn, and Barenklau, operating in obedience to orders, actually defeated a French detachment of Conti's Free-Corps near Oppenheim, directly in the rear of the French, on their own, the West side of the Rhine, which intervened between Conti and France. On receipt of this intelligence, Conti made no farther attempts to hold his ground, but repassed the

Rhine, 18th July, 1745, at Gernsheim and Rheinturkheim, below Worms, and encamped near that city behind the stream, Osthofen. From thence he retired to Mutterstadt. In this retreat the Prince of Conti lost his baggage and had his troops much harassed.

“Traun’s campaign has always received high commendation, because he compelled the French to retire behind the Rhine by well-planned marches and the choice of his positions alone. Political reasons prevented him from following the French, because Austria was dependent on its allies.”

This is a wonderful example of a series of victories without battles, in which Traun crossed and re-crossed the Rhine successfully in the presence of an enemy vastly superior in force, disconcerted all the plans of the French military leaders, traversed and re-traversed Germany with the speed of a cavalry corps, drove Frederic the Great out of Bohemia, and the French across the Rhine, and would have brought about a different result for history to record had he been left untrammelled by the Aulic Council.

In consequence of this successful practical strategy, the election at Frankfort was undisturbed and the grand duke Franz Stephen, in spite of all the opposition of France and Prussia, attained to the Imperial dignity. On the 8th Oct. 1745, the new Emperor, received his heroic wife, Maria Theresa, the queen of Hungary and Bohemia, in the camp at Heidelberg, and, thence, led her, thanks to Traun, back in triumph to Vienna.

Thither, now, likewise journeyed the triumphant Traun and, in consequence of the prospects of a general peace, which every day became more hopeful, received a year’s leave of absence to rest his war-worn body and mind. In

1747, the chief command in Transylvania was conferred upon him. This dignity however, he only enjoyed for a few weeks. On the 10th Feb., 1748, he died at the capital, Hermannstadt, at the advanced age of 70 years, not less honored and blessed at his death than when he had formerly laid down his vice-royal charge at Milan.

Khevenhuller and Traun have been styled by military critics, the (Ajax) Telamon and Fabius of Austria in its hour of extremest danger and its direst need. Their names appear in the list of the war chiefs of a military nation as those of heroes forever worthy of the highest praise and enduring gratitude of their country.

That Traun is comparatively unknown is undeniable; that he was the greatest practical strategist (i. e. General in the true sense of the word) of the middle half of the XVIII Century is indisputable. This seems a paradox and yet nothing is more susceptible of demonstration, when all the facts are brought together and considered.— It was Traun's misfortune throughout his career of Generalship to serve, even when invested with equal authority, with a reigning, powerful military king and with or under, as ad-latus, [i. e. Ger: *zur Seite* or *zur Hulfe*,] two princes, the first of whom, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was neutral as to the Spaniards, in regard to his Italian dominions, while, being husband of Traun's sovereign, he was actually hostile against them, and afterwards Emperor of Germany; the second, the brother of the former, a prince and arch duke and a pretender to sovereign rights. Serving with the King of Sardinia, Traun was eminently successful against the greatest odds and accomplished more than his inadequate means would seem to have justified his attempting. Yet the King, in general history has all the glory.

"The peer (Traun) slew the (Spanish) boar  
The king (Sardinian) had the gloire."

In 1744, especially upon the Rhine, Traun is scarcely noticed, and, in his operations against Frederic, Dupareq in his "Historical and Military Studies on Prussia" actually ascribes his actions to "Daun," and Lord Dover, in his "Life of Frederic II, the Great," to Brown (Braun.) Even Schlosser mistook Brown (Braun) for Traun, and represents the latter as fighting against the French and Spaniards in Italy, when he was actually battling against his own bodily infirmities at home. The result proves that all Traun's achievements served only to increase the celebrity of superiors in political rank and the brilliancy of his talents were absorbed in the splendor of the caste of his coadjutors. Such is the trustworthiness of "History for the Million," "the things' called histories (which) are worse than 'will of the wisps'." Such is the injustice daily culminating even around us.

Schlosser and Russell, and even Colletta, while admitting that Traun covered himself with glory in Italy, in 1734, cannot free themselves from the weight of prejudiced authorities so as to do justice to Traun, and make him as conspicuous as he deserves. The Austro-Italian Viceroy to whom he owed obedience, ran away after he had frittered away Traun's supports, and enriched himself, and "left Traun to shift for himself"; and Visconti's coadjutor Caraffa, who has the suffrages of Italian historians, after doing all the harm that he could do, was ordered to Vienna to justify his conduct before the Supreme Council when no more harm could be done, leaving to Traun the only alternative of unavailing resistance or of succumbing gloriously. In a word, Traun's superiors having prepared inevitable defeat, left him to suffer a certain reverse which by his manner of meeting it converted Traun's mishaps into the instruments of his apotheosis.

Hormayr, in his Austrian Plutarch concludes his biog-

raphy of Traun with eloquent reflections, of which the following are, in some respects, as close a translation as his German will permit, to avoid obscurity.

It is indeed a great glory to be the fortunate leader of victorious armies at an epoch of great and general war and, by success, to ENLARGE the dominions of a native state. But such a famous and fortunate career is not reserved for every general, and it is perhaps a still greater glory to assume the command at the most imminent crisis and the direst need of a nation and SAVE a country, as was the case with Khevenhuller and with Traun. For even as that leader dares and adventures much less who fights against his equal in a varying and alternately successful campaign than another commander who carries on a defensive campaign against long and constantly successful superiority, or against swift, ever-increasing and overpowering force, furious as a mountain torrent, even so HIGHER honor cannot be denied to even INFERIOR genius and skill when the deficiency is made up by a noble contempt of danger and loss of reputation with the multitude, or by indomitable force of will, the only quality which presents an individual as equally great under favorable, or adverse circumstances.

It was this invincible, never despairing determination which made Traun so great, and greatly to be admired, and it is as a, perhaps, not always victorious, but still never subdued War Chief, that his image looms up before us in the Present so strikingly grand from the misty distance of a great epoch of the Past.

TRAUN should never be forgotten by any military student as a wonderful example of skill, making amends for want of Fortune, and as a Master of that Science which is most needed at this juncture, the misunderstood but inestimable application of PRACTICAL STRATEGY.

## SUMMARY.

"He is the *best* general who wins a *decisive* battle with the *loss of the fewest men.*"  
MANY THOUGHTS ON MANY THINGS.

"BATTLES are the *last* Resort of a good General."

"He is one that accounts Learning the Nourishment of Military Virtue, and lays that as his first foundation. He had rather save one of his own soldiers than kill ten of his enemies. \* \* He knows the hazards of battles—not the pomp of ceremonies are soldiers' best theatres. \* \* He understands, in wars there is no means to err twice; the first and least fault being sufficient to ruin an army; faults, therefore, he pardons none; they that are presidents of disorder or mutiny, repair it by being examples of his justice. Besiege him never so strictly, so long as the air is not cut from him, his heart faints not. He hath learned as well to make use of a victory as to get it; and in pursuing his enemy, like a whirlwind, carries all afore him, being assured if ever a man will benefit himself upon his foe, then is the time, when they have lost force, wisdom, courage, and reputation. \* \* If he cannot overcome his enemy by Force, he does it by Time. \* \* He carries a smiling contempt upon calumny; it meets him as if glass should encounter adamant. He thinks war is never to be given over but on one of these three conditions:—an assured peace, absolute victory, or an honest death."

SIR THOMAS OVERBURY.

"Strategy may be divided into" Hypothetical (i. e. newspaper), Theoretical, Applied, (i. e. actual, check-mate, *werkthatige*), and *Tactical* (in which battles are necessary agents), Strategy." W. P. W.

There is nothing, perhaps, so generally misunderstood, even by military men, both as to definition, theory, and application, as PRACTICAL (efficacious or real,) STRATEGY. The *Anaconda System*, once so vaunted, now as much reviled, which often succeeds against a rebellion, particularly when that rebellion has elements of discord within itself, is nothing more than one application of Practical (efficiently operative) Strategy. Nevertheless, to succeed, its forces must be exerted just as the monster snake applies its powers. It is the peculiar property of our countrymen to cry hosannas over everything that is at once *apparently* successful, and condemn everything which does not work smoothly and immediately in a bungler's hands. At first, every one was in favor of what was termed the *Anaconda Strategy*; now, everybody is against it. The first opinion was correct at that time, because the country had every reason to suppose there was a strong union element within the South, and the second, changed, opinion may be equally right at this time, since it has been proved that the union sentiment cannot exert itself effectually. Both opinions may have been correct but at different times, and under different circumstances. But if the *Anaconda System* did not succeed, even apparently, why did it fail? Because those who undertook to apply it, did not study and imitate the action of the *anaconda* itself. The colossal reptile does not simply encircle its prey with an inert, flaccid coil and bring its strength to bear in spasmodic, dislocated efforts, but, as soon as the object of its attack is begirt with its tremendous contractile force, it exerts that force with terrible, simultaneous, persistent intensity and keeps up the pressure equally and everywhere, until all the power of resistance is extinct, and its prey is crushed into an inert mass, fitted to be swallowed up, to nourish and to recuperate, for new efforts, the very power which destroyed it. So should our *anaconda* of armies and fleets have acted and so should the North still continue to act until the South is crushed into a submission which could not present any form or consistence to prevent the North from moulding its future according to its will and pleasure, and thus derive, from its transformed condition, adequate resources to meet new enemies at home or abroad.

In one respect however our *Anaconda System*, let quid nunc argue what they will, did not fail after all, for what could have been ac-



complished had not the blockading squadrons completed and maintained its coil. So vast however was the circumference embraced that our efforts only amounted in some quarters to what Decker styles *Paralysis* of the enemy, in others to *Neutralization*. Perhaps there are no two ideas more opposite than Theoretical, dead or in-operative, and Practical, or efficient, Strategy. The former may have succeeded in just a sufficient number of instances to justify its consideration by a military analyzer and critic. Under what head can McClellan's operations on the Potomac '61-'2 be classified? Was it Practical Strategy, as Decker taught? Would it be unjust to style it theoretical-strategical-neutralization of the rebel masses in presence or supposed to be antagonistic? It certainly was not *Werkthatige Strategie*, for the Federalists were not active.

"But, when," says Decker, "theoretical strategy ventures to pretend that it can force an enemy to abandon his position by simply manoeuvring and without running the risk of fighting or conflicts, this magnificent theory will be very rarely realized in practice, and, even then, only when the enemy proves himself extraordinarily feeble" morally and physically.

That great results have been accomplished by even second class generals, through their comprehension and application of Practical (real) Strategy, without delivering or accepting, or without being forced into a great battle, has been proved by all reliable military history. Not to go back too far, let us begin with the era of Louis XI, who, weighing means and results, was the greatest sovereign who sat upon the throne of France, both as to practical diplomacy, practical administration, and practical strategy, as applicable in accordance with the military organization of his era. Take for instance, his successful campaign, of 1463, against the "League of the Public Good." The only fit comparisons or foils to it, at hand, are one or two of Frederic's Campaigns, in the Seven Years War, and Napoleon's offensive-defensive campaign of 1814 against the Allies in France. Taking into consideration, time, circumstances, means and forces, Louis dissolved, by head-work, heart-work and hand-work, a greater Coalition, in 1463, than Frederic, in 1757-'63, and than Napoleon held in check, in 1814.

As this brochure is written to do justice to one of the great men obscured by the great titles and lofty positions of little men, it is scarcely a digression to declare what immense strides the ill-known Louis XI, almost as generally unappreciated and unknown to the masses as Traun, made towards modern military systemization.—He was the first who made practical and sensible ameliorations in siege artillery; he first substituted brass cannon, founded entire, for iron cannon, wrought, in pieces, and cast, solid shot for cut stone and marble balls. He was the creator of grand reviews, the germs of camps of instruction, and military inspections, regular troops with fire arms, and light cavalry proper. He, himself, encouraged printing, and he never injured the people however deeply he wounded the aristocracy. Comines attests that Louis XI established a Camp of Instruction at Pont de l'Arche, in which he assembled 20,000 men, and kept them together for several years under the strictest discipline, practicing manoeuvres and observing every precaution as if in front of an enemy. As a creator Louis was greater than Napoleon, as a king and a man not more selfish and criminal, particularly if we take into consideration the difference of means, manners and morals at the epochs in which they severally shone.

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With but a reference to antiquity, and without groping through the misty scenes of chivalric eras or going over the whole range of the military operations of the last three centuries, simple allusions to a few notable achievements will be sufficient as Examples of Practical Strategy.

Among the ancients there was no Practical Strategist who could approach to Hannibal. He was Practical Strategy incarnate. Scipio Africanus showed his comprehension of the same art or science by carrying the war into Spain and Africa, whereby he forced Hannibal to abandon Italy, and conquered Carthage. He struck at his opponent's communications, and his base.

In recent times consider the 2 campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, 1631-'2, how influential, yet only two decisive battles:—Baner's 4 campaigns, 1636-'41, how destructive, yet only one first class battle:—Torstenson's 4 campaigns, 1642-'45, in which he brought Austria to the brink of destruction, conquered Denmark, paralyzed Saxony, ruined three of the finest armies which the empire had sent into the field and performed two marches which are worthy of comparison with any recorded in ancient or modern annals, yet he fought only 2 first class battles:—[to whom in this present war shall we compare the great Swede's opponent, the popular Gallas, known in military annals as the "Ruiner of (of his own) armies?"]:—Wrangel's 3 campaigns, 1645-'8, carried on according to the plan and under the advice of Torstenson, which finished the XXX Years War, present but one conflict, approaching the importance of a battle properly speaking, Susmarshausen, a great surprise or vast skirmish:—Turenne and Montecuculi's 2 campaigns, 1674-'5, how instructive, nevertheless only 2 battles:—[Turenne fell when about to deliver a third, and the French had to abandon the right or east bank of the Rhine:]—Prince Eugene's campaign of 1706 and flank march from Trent to Turin, "a master piece of daring enterprise" resulting in a victory which swept the French out of Italy:—Traun's 2 campaigns of 1744-'5, without a battle, in which he nevertheless invaded France, saved Bohemia, secured the election of the Emperor Francis and accomplished all he sought to do:—Frederic the Great's campaign of Rosbach and Leuthen, 1757, superior to anything which the world has ever yet witnessed:—Görgey's 2 campaigns of 1848-'9, which, if the Russians had not interfered would have finished the Austrian Imperialty:—and Radetsky's 2 campaigns of 1848-'9, in the first of which he dissipated the Sardinian delusions of ambition, and in the second placed his nonagenarian heel upon the neck of prostrate Sardinia herself. Three of Frederic's battles tower up like the highest peaks of the Himalayas as wonderful examples of Practical Strategy, Rosbach and Leuthen of annihilating superior armies, Liegnitz a double operation of paralyzing one and beating another army at the same time.

As an illustration, Vauban was an example of Practical Strategy in Engineering just as Rosbach and Leuthen and Liegnitz were instances of Practical Strategy in Fighting. Gilmore seems to be playing the Vauban in this war, expending bullets and sweat and saving men and blood. Just as there was no *stand still* with Vauban and Frederic, and in a minor sphere with Traun, just so there is no convulsive jerks forward with Gilmore and Rosecrans, but assured progress.

No reference is made to the campaigns of Napoleon, because he is the writer's detestation, never referred to except necessity compels.

J. WATTS DE PEYSER,

ROSE HILL, TIVOLI, September 5th, 1863.

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